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The Self-Supporting Rural Development Project with Saemaul Undong's Participatory 
Approach (hereafter SMU) in Myanmar, implemented jointly by Korea International 
Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation 
(MOALI) from 2014 to 2019, is the largest rural development project in Southeast Asia 
implemented by KOICA. Excluding the budget for the construction of the Saemaul Undong 
Training Institute in Myanmar, the project is worth more than 10 billion Korean won 
(equivalent to USD 9 million), which includes the budget for the implementation of rural 
community development projects in 100 pilot villages across nine regions in Myanmar over 
three years. 
As the scale of KOICA's development projects has expanded dramatically, and projects 
with large budgets of over 10 billion won, including Myanmar's rural community 
development projects, have increased significantly, there have been increasing discussions 
on how to evaluate various projects implemented by KOICA. The evaluation method used 
by KOICA can be described as Process Evaluation using Project Design Matrix(PDM), 
which summarizes the logical framework based on the Theory of Change. While the PDM 
evaluated in the order of inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts has the 
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advantage of being particularly useful for process evaluation, it assumes a causal 
relationship between inputs/activities and outcomes/impacts and thus cannot be scientifically 
proven.
In an effort to address these limitations of process evaluation, impact evaluation 
method focused on identifying causal relationships has received increasing attention. Abhijit 
Banerjee (University of MIT), Esther Duflo (University of MIT), and Michael Kremer 
(University of Harvard) have conducted impact evaluations applying a randomized 
controlled trial (RCT) to various development projects since the mid-1990s. They have also 
received the 2019 Nobel Prize in Economics for their contributions to poverty alleviation 
and development policies based on scientific evidence derived from impact evaluation 
findings.
National aid agencies such as USAID and DFID, and inter-governmental organizations 
such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have been actively conducting 
impact evaluations of their development projects. In particular, the World Bank has 
established the Development Impact Evaluation Initiative (DIME) in order to evaluate their 
major projects. KOICA also carried out an impact evaluation, along with process 
evaluation, when implementing the Myanmar rural community development project in line 
with these international evaluation trends. The Myanmar Rural Development Project Impact 
Evaluation Study is meaningful in that it is the first large-scale impact evaluation research 
conducted by KOICA.3) 
The rest of the report is as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes the background of the 
impact evaluation of the KOICA Myanmar Rural Development Project, Chapter 3 discusses 
the impact evaluation methodology, and Chapter 4 analyzes the main results of the impact 
evaluation. Finally, in Chapter 5, we provide recommendations for policymakers who are 
planning to implement a large-scale impact evaluation study such as the Myanmar rural 
development project. 
The summary of the impact evaluation results of the Myanmar rural development 
project is as follows. There was no statistically significant impact on social capital, which 
was set as one of the main outcome variables, but the Myanmar rural development project 
improved the living environment in the village, increased access to microfinance, and 
increased income. Since a randomized controlled trial, comparing randomly selected 
3) KOICA's first impact evaluation efforts was the evaluation of drinking water improvement projects conducted in Volta, 
Ghana, West Africa from 2012 to 2014 (Cha et al., 2015). Cha, Seungman, Douk Kang, Benedict Tuffuor, Gyuhong 
Lee, Jungmyung Cho, Jihye Chung, Myongjin Kim, Hoonsang Lee, Jaeeun Lee, and Chunghyeon Oh. "The effect of 
improved water supply on diarrhea prevalence of children under five in the Volta region of Ghana: a cluster-randomized 
controlled trial." International journal of environmental research and public health 12, no. 10 (2015): 12127-12143.
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treatment villages to control villages, was not possible for this impact evaluation study, 
two behavioral experiments were implemented.
KOICA's rural development project in Southeast Asia reflects the experience of 
Saemaul Undong in Korea, and includes a differential incentive structure that pays 
incentives to villages with better performance through competition among project villages. 
The behavioral experiments attempted to analyze whether the inter-village competition, a 
key mechanism of the KOICA rural development projects, affected the increase of social 
capital in the villages. In Myanmar, where the level of social capital was remarkably high 
from the baseline, we could not observe any effect of the inter-village competition from 
the behavioral experiments.4)
Background
KOICA has invested an extraordinarily large budget into its Project Management 
Consulting (PMC) contract while developing the rural development project in Myanmar. 
Since the Myanmar rural development project was the largest in scale among the rural 
development projects that KOICA carried out in five Southeast Asian countries, there was 
a demand within KOICA that the Myanmar project was accompanied by a strict 
evaluation. A total of four surveys (one baseline survey, two midline surveys and one 
endline survey) were conducted for 100 pilot villages in nine regions. Table 1 lists the 
100 pilot villages divided into village tracks, townships, and regions.
Table 1. List of 100 SMU Villages
4) In case of behavioral experiments, the study was designed as a comparative study of two countries, Myanmar and 
Cambodia. The Pre-Analysis Plan for this study titled “The Impact of Inter-Village Competition and Leadership on 
Collective Action: Experimental Evidence from Myanmar and Cambodia” was uploaded on the AEA RCT Registry on 
May 7, 2019. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4180.
No. Village Name Village Tract Township Region
1 Zeephyukone Yan Aung Myin Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
2 Pauktaw Yan Aung Myin Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
3 Tatpoe Yan Aung Myin Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
4 Ywarma (YAM) Yan Aung Myin Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
5 Ywarma (YM) Ywar Ma Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
6 Myaukkyaungs Ywar Ma Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
7 Taungkyaungs Ywar Ma Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
8 KyarKoo (Wes Ywar Ma Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
9 KyarKoo (Eas Ywar Ma Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
10 Shwepyi Ywar Ma Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
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No. Village Name Village Tract Township Region
11 Chai Chai Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
12 Maetee Chai Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
13 Shwekeinn Shwe keinn Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
14 Kyaukeinn Shwe keinn Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
15 Kywetae Shwekeinn Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
16 Gusaesu (Sae Gusaesu Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
17 Tharyarsu Gusaesu Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
18 Padaukkone Gusaesu(saesu) Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
19 Magyikone Gusaesu(saesu) Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
20 Gwaydaukyoe Guu Sel Su Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
21 Kyesar U Gusaesu(saesu) Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
22 Doenwe Doenwe Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
23 Ywarthit Doenwe Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
24 Yede Doenwe Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
25 Aungthukha Kyar Pin Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
26 Htantapin Kyar Pin Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
27 Nyaungkone Kyun Tatpet Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
28 Saesu (Kyunt Kyauntatpe Dekhinathiri NayPyiTaw
29 Maezalekone Maezalekone Pyinmana NayPyiTaw
30 Kyaunkone Ywarthit Pyinmana NayPyiTaw
31 Ywarthar Ywarthar Pyinmana NayPyiTaw
32 Ngakaungkan Ngakaungkan Pyinmana NayPyiTaw
33 Gonemininn Taegyigone Zebuthiri NayPyiTaw
34 Shartaw Thae Gyikone Zebuthiri NayPyiTaw
35 Taegyikone Taegyigone Zebuthiri NayPyiTaw
36 Kyankhinsu Yonepin Lewe NayPyiTaw
37 Thawmawkone Thawmawkone Lewe NayPyiTaw
38 Kyaunkone (L Thawmawkone Lewe NayPyiTaw
39 Kanthar Thawmawkone Lewe NayPyiTaw
40 Yanking (E) Ayelar Lewe NayPyiTaw
41 Luyoetaung Konlon Taunggyi Shan
42 Phayarmae Konlon Taunggyi Shan
43 Benkanywarma Konlon Taunggyi Shan
44 Nyaungzin Konlon Taunggyi Shan
45 Kyautsu Konlon Taunggyi Shan
46 Tharminekhan Tharminekhan Kalaw Shan
47 Latpanpin Thikhaung Kalaw Shan
48 Oattakan Thikhaung Kalaw Shan
49 Poneinn Heho Kalaw Shan
50 Naunglawe Kyouk Htat Kalaw Shan
51 Daungyway Daungyway Amarapura Mandalay
52 Mintekone Sin bo Amarapura Mandalay
53 Nandar Nandar Patheingyi Mandalay
54 Nweni Nyein Chan Thar Zan Patheingyi Mandalay
55 Banttin Banttin Patheingyi Mandalay
56 Latthit Latthit Patheingyi Mandalay
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No. Village Name Village Tract Township Region
57 Shwepyaeyin Shwepyaeyin Nwarhtoegyi Mandalay
58 Htangua (Sou Htangua Nwarhtoegyi Mandalay
59 Htanzin (Sou Htangua Nwarhtoegyi Mandalay
60 Kanphyu (E) Latkaunggyi Matayar Mandalay
61 Butar Butar Chaung Oo Sagaing
62 Shwedarkya Nyaung Pin Thar Chaung Oo Sagaing
63 Sulaekone Sulaekone Chaung Oo Sagaing
64 Inma King Mon Taw Chaung Oo Sagaing
65 Yargyitaw Wayar Chaung Oo Sagaing
66 Kutokone Kutokone Myaung Sagaing
67 Kyar O Kyar O Myaung Sagaing
68 Tamasaykan Tamasaykan Myaung Sagaing
69 Kyauk O Kyouk O Minkin Sagaing
70 Kanpyar (E) Kanpyar Myinmu Sagaing
71 Zayatsait Kyaungpankone Pathein Ayarwaddy
72 Kanniphyar Kanni Pathein Ayarwaddy
73 Phayargyikon Paukkone Pathein Ayarwaddy
74 Tikeswan Koesu Pathein Ayarwaddy
75 Kwatpyingyi Linnwungyi Pathein Ayarwaddy
76 Nyaungchaung Kyonegyi Kangyidauk Ayarwaddy
77 Kwinyargyi Kwinyargyi Kangyidauk Ayarwaddy
78 Sarphyusu (K Myinkaseik Kangyidauk Ayarwaddy
79 Ywarthitkone Michaungtayar Kangyidauk Ayarwaddy
80 Kyaunchaung Khonezinkone Kangyidauk Ayarwaddy
81 Pyitawthar ( Kali Bago Bago
82 Deweinn Ahtetzaingganainggyi Bago Bago
83 Taungthusu Katwinchan Bago Bago
84 Saynyaungpin Outcity (East) Bago Bago
85 Ywarma (Mayi Mayin Bago Bago
86 Waegyi Waegyi Kyauktan Yangon
87 Ahtetkhamat Khmat Khayan Yangon
88 Nankhalae Latpan Tonegwa Yangon
89 Yoewa Myaungtakar Hmawbe Yangon
90 Yintaikwin Yintaikwin Taikgyi Yangon
91 Daykin Daykin Paung Mon
92 Oatkan Oatkan Paung Mon
93 Ahauk Ahauk Paung Mon
94 Kadine Kadine Paung Mon
95 Kawhtaw Kawhtaw Paung Mon
96 Kaningdar Kanaingdar Dawei Tanintharyi
97 Zahar Zahar Dawei Tanintharyi
98 Maungmaeshau Maungmaeshaung Dawei Tanintharyi
99 Tharyarkone Tharyarkone Lounglone Tanintharyi
100 Maemaw Thabyar Lounglone Tanintharyi
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However, it was not possible to carry out an impact evaluation to prove the causality 
of KOICA's rural development project by conducting a survey only on the 100 project 
villages. The initial settings of the evaluation only allowed process evaluation based on 
before-and-after analysis.
While KOICA was deeply aware of the need for an impact evaluation based on a 
rigorous design, there was no specific discussion of what procedures are required to carry 
out these impact evaluations, how the evaluation studies should be designed, and how the 
budget should be reflected.
In order to conduct an impact evaluation, the impact evaluation lab of the KDI School 
of Public Policy and Management signed a contract with the KOICA. In consultation with 
the MOALI, we identified 50 control villages while the first year of the Myanmar Rural 
Community Development Project was underway in the 100 SMU villages. The Agricultural 
Department of MOALI selected the 50 comparison villages that share similar characteristics 
to the 100 pilot villages within the same townships. The 50 control villages are listed in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. List of 50 Comparison Villages
No. Village Name Village Tract Township Region
1 Ma Pu Pin Kyun Oo Pyinmana Nay Pyi Taw
2 Lae Luu I Le Lu Aing Pyinmana Nay Pyi Taw
3 Zaung Chan Kone Nga Kaung Kan Pyinmana Nay Pyi Taw
4 A Lyin Lo Ah Lyin Lo Zebuthiri Nay Pyi Taw
5 Pan Tin Pyaung Gaung Gyi Lewe Nay Pyi Taw
6 Tha Man Pin Aye Lar Lewe Nay Pyi Taw
7 Thae Kaw Lay Thea Kaw Gyi Lewe Nay Pyi Taw
8 Kan Oo Pay Tone Hmyaung Lewe Nay Pyi Taw
9 Ma Dot Pin Ma Tawt Pin Lewe Nay Pyi Taw
10 Ta Lote Pin Ta Loke Pin Lewe Nay Pyi Taw
11 Kone Paw Su Pay Tone Hmyaung Lewe Nay Pyi Taw
12 Zee Kone Yae Oe Sin Lewe Nay Pyi Taw
13 Nyaung Pin Thar Si Paing Lewe Nay Pyi Taw
14 Hman Taw Thet Kei Chin Lewe Nay Pyi Taw
15 Watt Ka Mu Wet Ka Mu Lewe Nay Pyi Taw
16 Kyoe Pin Kyoet Pin Lewe Nay Pyi Taw
17 Nan Aww Kun Long Taunggyi Shan
18 Thein Inn Kun Long Taunggyi Shan
19 Narr Hit Kun Long Taunggyi Shan
20 Myat Sat (North) Baw Nin Kalaw Shan
21 Taung Pat Thi Hkawng Kalaw Shan
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Usually, the baseline survey is conducted on both the treatment and control groups 
prior to the project implementation. In case of the Myanmar rural development project, the 
control villages were selected during the first year of project implementation, and thus we 
could not conduct interviews for the pilot villages and control villages simultaneously. 
For this reason, we first signed a contract with the Good Neighbors Myanmar branch 
to conduct the baseline survey for 100 pilot villages. In December 2015, we collected data 
for a census of 18,000 households through a household survey conducted in 100 pilot 
villages across nine regions. Through systematic random sampling method, we selected 
5,500 households which is 30% of the total number of households and conducted the 
baseline survey on February 2016.5)
No. Village Name Village Tract Township Region
22 Nyaung Pin Khar Shae Baw Nin Kalaw Shan
23 Thar Hla Aye Ta Moke Soe Amarapura Mandalay
24 Kan Kwe Nay Rit Sa Ya Patheingyi Mandalay
25 Taung Ta Tine Shae Taung Tatine Shay Patheingyi Mandalay
26 Oak Twin Oke Twin Nwar Htoe Gyi Mandalay
27 Tha Pyay Kone Let Kaung Gyi Matayar Mandalay
28 Htar Wae Inn Ku Lar Gyi Chaung Oo Sagaing
29 Shwe Kuu Shwe Gu Chaung Oo Sagaing
30 Phwar Saw Hpwar Saw Myaung Sagaing
31 Inngyin Taung Inn Kyin Taung Minkin Sagaing
32 Sat Pyar Kyin Kan Taw Myin Mu Sagaing
33 Tike Gyi Kone Tike Gyi Kone Pathein Ayeyarwaddy
34 Pyin Ka Toe Kone Pyin Ka Doe Kone Pathein Ayeyarwaddy
35 Kyauk Chaung Kyi Kyauk Chaung Gyi Pathein Ayeyarwaddy
36 Yoe Gyi Tha Bawt Ngu Kangyi Dauk Ayeyarwaddy
37 Ka Twin Chan Tha Bawt Ngu Kangyi Dauk Ayeyarwaddy
38 Thae Gyi Kone Kyon Gyi Kangyi Dauk Ayeyarwaddy
39 Pyi Taw Aye Ma Yin Bago Bago
40 Ka Twin Chan Ka Twin Chan Bago Bago
41 Thae Gyi Kone Ah Htet Zaing Ga Naing Gyi Bago Bago
42 That Kal Gyin Thet Kei Kone Kha Yan Yangon
43 Tha Yet Taw War Net Chaung Bu Tar Hmawbi Yangon
44 Oak Kan Kan Kone Oke Kan Kan Kone Tike Gyi Yangon
45 Kyar Bo Kyar Bo Paung Mon
46 Nyaung Kone Lay Nyaung Kone Lay Paung Mon
47 Bai Laung Htan Pin Chaung Gyi Paung Mon
48 Thae Pone Thar Yar Kone Launglone Tanintharyi
49 Za Lon Za Lun Htarwae Tanintharyi
50 Kyauk Yat Kyauk Yat Htarwae Tanintharyi
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The Good Neighbors Myanmar branch, which conducted the baseline survey at that 
time, signed a contract to conduct a total of four surveys (one baseline, two midline, and 
one endline) for 100 pilot villages and survey costs for control villages were not included 
in the budget. The Development Research Team of KDI School of Public Policy and 
Management signed a contract with the Myanmar Survey Research (MSR), which provided 
consultation services when the Good Neighbor Myanmar Branch conducted the baseline 
survey for pilot villages. MSR also conducted the baseline survey for 3,000 households of 
50 comparison villages (60 households per village). 
There were discussions on how to coordinate the midline and endline data collections, 
given the different agencies conducting the baseline survey of 100 pilot villages and 50 
control villages. We terminated the survey service contract with the Good Neighbors 
Myanmar Branch for 100 pilot villages and changed the contract with the MSR to conduct 
both the midline and endline surveys for 100 pilot villages and 50 control villages. MSR 
conducted the midline and endline surveys for 5,500 households in 100 pilot villages, and 
3,000 households in 50 control villages (in total 8,500 households in 150 villages) in 
February 2018 and May 2019, respectively. 
Through this, evaluation of Myanmar's rural community development project, which 
was based on a before and after comparison process evaluation and performance evaluation, 
could be developed into an impact evaluation setting by employing the 
difference-in-differences method. The difference-in-difference analysis compares the change 
from baseline to endline between the treatment and control groups. 
Figure 1 visually describes the difference-in-difference analysis. It seems that the 
characteristics between treatment and comparison villages prior to the intervention are 
different. However, their slopes are parallel meaning that the treatment and comparison 
villages share the same trend. The effect of the intervention is calculated by subtracting 
the difference in changes between the treatment and comparison villages. The 
difference-in-difference method is widely used in impact evaluation studies in settings 
where RCT is not possible. 
5) It is important to extract a representative sample that reflects the characteristics of the population. In a poll conducted 
before the US presidential election in 1936, Landon, then a Republican candidate, was expected to win a big vote over 
Roosevelt, but the result was the opposite. Poll was conducted from car and landline owners during the Great 
Depression, who were economically rich Republican supporters. If the sample is not representative of the population, it 
is difficult to infer the population parameter accurately from the sample statistics. In the Myanmar SMU Project Baseline 
Survey, representative samples could be extracted through census data collection as well as systematic random sampling. 
Choi, E. Seul, and Booyuel Kim. "A Beginner's Guide to Randomized Evaluations in Development Economics." Seoul 
Journal of Economics 29.4 (2016): 529-552.
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Figure 1. Example of Difference-in-Difference
In case of the Myanmar rural development project, we do not have information prior 
to the intervention, and thus it is not possible to test the parallel trend assumption6) which 
is the key assumption for using difference-in-difference analysis. The endogenous selection 
of the 100 pilot villages and the ex-post selection of the comparison villages can be 
considered as the limitation of the Myanmar rural development project. 
In order to overcome this limitation, the research team included a within village RCT 
component in order to explain the key mechanism of the Myanmar rural development 
project. First, we identified the inter-village competition structure as a characteristic of the 
Myanmar rural development project, which is clearly distinguished from the existing rural 
development projects  (CDD).  Then, we introduced two lab-in-the-field experiments – (i) 
Public Goods Game and (ii) Joint Investment Game. We randomly assigned the sampled 
households into two groups under each game. In February 2018, the public goods game 
was conducted on 8,500 households during the midline survey, and the joint investment 
game was conducted during the endline survey in May 2019. While the lab-in-the-field 
experiment is not an impact evaluation study that directly analyzes the effectiveness of a 
rural development project in Myanmar, the design allows us to examine the effect of the 
6) Parallel trend assumption means that the treatment and comparison groups would have followed a same trajectory without 
the intervention/treatment. 
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core mechanism of Korean CDD projects (differentiated incentive system based on 
inter-village competition) under a rigorous randomized controlled trial (RCT) design.
Myanmar Rural Community-driven Development Project
Myanmar has the per capita income of US$ 1,326 (World Bank, 2018), making it one 
of the poorest countries in ASEAN. Myanmar has high income inequality between urban 
and rural areas, and suffer from poor rural environment due to lack of investment in the 
agricultural sector. Accordingly, the Myanmar government, together with the KOICA, 
implemented the Myanmar rural community development project of $ 22 million for a total 
of 5 years from 2014 based on the experience of the Saemaul Undong in South Korea. 
In case of the Myanmar rural community development project, we set key performance 
indicators (KPI) in three areas: (i) capacity building project; (ii) village environment 
improvement project; (iii) income generation project. Then, we evaluate 100 villages every 
year and rank them from first to 100th.
The main performance indicators for the capacity building project were the number of 
capacity building meetings, number of training sessions, participants in training, and 
participants in excursions to A-ranking villages in other regions. The main performance 
indicators for the village environment improvement project were (i) residents' participation 
in the fund; (ii) provision of labor; (iii) land provision; and (iv) the number of households 
participating in the village environment improvement project. Lastly, the main performance 
indicators for the income generation project were (i) the increase of the village 
development fund; (ii) the participants in the micro-loans; and (iii) the number of new 
projects that were evaluated.
The performance of each village, measured through the key performance indicators for 
each project, was calculated annually and each village was ranked based on the calculation. 
Based on their ranking from the previous year, differential support was provided, which is 
the key characteristic of the Myanmar rural development project.
Table 3. Key Performance Indicators
Objective Key Performance Indicators
1. Capacity Building Number of meeting
Number of technical/ educational training
Number of trainee
Number of villagers visit to other advanced villages
Number of public information on project movement
Endline Report for the Self-Supporting Rural Development Project with Saemaul Undong's Participatory Approach in Myanmar  13
At the beginning of the first year of the project, all 100 villages received the same 
amount of $ 20,000 as the village development fund. Based on the performance of the 
first year, the top 30 villages were ranked A, the next 40 villages were ranked B, and the 
bottom 30 villages were ranked C. Based on this ranking, village development funds were 
differentially provided. 
The top 30 villages, A-ranked villages, received $ 40,000, which is twice the first 
year's village development fund. The B-ranked villages received $ 30,000, an increase of $ 
10,000 from the first year. The C-ranked villages received $ 20,000, the same amount as 
in the first year. After completing the second-year project, the village development fund 
was distributed in the same way in the third year.
Table 4. Differential Incentive System by Year
Year Rank Village 
Development Fund
Number of Villages Total Budget
2016
(First Year)
- $20,000 100 $2,000,000
2017
(Second Year)
A $40,000 30 $1,200,000
B $30,000 40 $1,200,000
C $20,000 30 $600,000
2018
(Third Year)
A $40,000 30 $1,200,000
B $30,000 40 $1,200,000
C $20,000 30 $600,000
2019
A $15,000 30 $450,000
B $10,000 40 $400,000
C $5,000 30 $150,000
Total $9,000,000
Objective Key Performance Indicators
2. Environment 
Improvement




Number of participant households
Villagers’ land/ materials contribution
3. Income Generation Fund increment by means of interest
Number of microfinance participant households
Adoption of new business and technologies
14
After the third year of implementation, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock of 
Myanmar and KOICA no longer managed the rural community development project, and 
individual villages voluntarily continued their village development project. In addition, a 
bonus incentive of $ one million was set up so that the third-year project could be carried 
out steadily and the rural community development project could be continued. In the third 
year, A-ranking villages receive an additional $ 15,000, B-ranking villages receive a $ 
10,000 bonus, and C-ranking villages receive $5,000. 100 pilot villages participating in the 
rural development project receive a minimum of $ 65,000 and a maximum of $ 115,000 
as village development fund from 2016 to 2019, and the total budget amounts to $ 9 
million.
In summary, KOICA's Rural Development Project in Myanmar, based on the 
experience of Saemaul Undong in Korea, focused on (i) improving village leaders and 
community members’ capacity, (ii) improving village environment such as roads and 
drinking water, and (iii) income generation activities through micro-loan projects. Besides, 
key performance indicators were set for each objective, 100 villages were objectively 
ranked based on the indicators, and differentiated incentives were provided based on each 
village’s ranking. This inter-village competition system is a unique feature which 




In the field of social science, the existing empirical studies often relies on simple 
correlation analysis, which  not systematic nor rigorous. Accordingly, Leamer (1983) 
proposed a sensitivity analysis to examine if consistent results follow from different models 
and assumptions. However, this approach was insufficient to prove a causal relationship.7) 
In the field of empirical economics since the late 1990s, many researchers recognized 
the importance of rigorous research design such as instrumental variables (IV) and 
randomized controlled trials (RCT) (Angrist and Pischke, 2010). 
7) The sensitivity analysis proposed by Leamer examines if similar results are found after changing the specification or 
functional form.
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Among study designs that demonstrate a rigorous causal relationship, the RCT method 
has received particular attention (Duflo and Kremer, 2005; Duflo et al. 2007). The 
randomized controlled trial method was already recognized as a rigorous research 
methodology for a long time in the medical field, and this research methodology was 
introduced in the social science field, especially in the economic field, in the late 1990s.
It is difficult to prove the causality of a specific project simply by comparing before 
and after the implementation. If we try to prove causality by comparing the people 
participating in the project and those not participating in the project, there could be a 
selection bias issue because the people who participated in the project may not share 
similar characteristics from those who did not participate. In order to prove a causal 
relationship, we need a “counterfactual” and Rubin (1974) explained this using the 
Potential Outcome Model.8)
The potential outcome model proposed by Rubin assumes the counterfactual outcome 
by looking at the treatment effect and the selection bias. First, an individual i can either 
be assigned to a treatment or not which is shown by Di = {0, 1}. The outcome variable 
of interest is Yi, and we are interested in the impact of the treatment (Di) on Yi. If an 
individual i received the treatment (Di = 1), the outcome can be denoted as Y1i. If 
individual i did not receive the treatment (Di = 0), the outcome can be denoted as  Y0i.
<Equation 1> The treatment effect on i = Y1i - Y0i
In reality, individual i can only face one condition of either receiving the treatment or 
not. If an individual i receives the treatment, we will not be able to observe the 
counterfactual outcome which is Y0i. Since we cannot observe both Y1i  or Y0i at the 
same time, the equation will look as follows: 
<Equation 2> Yi = Y0i + (Y1i - Y0i) * Di
This is called the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference. Since we cannot observe 
the counterfactual, if we compare the average outcomes for the treatment group and the 
control group, we will be looking at the following: 
<Equation 3> E[Yi|Di = 1] - E[Yi|Di = 0] = E[Y1i|Di = 1] - E[Y0i|Di = 0]
8) Counterfactual shows the results that would have happened to participants if they have not participated in the program.
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The problem in <Equation 3> is the difference between the treatment group (Di = 1) 
and the control group (Di = 0). In order to prove the causal impact of a project, all 
conditions apart from the treatment status has to be the same. In reality, since we are 
comparing different individuals, many factors can bias the result. In <Equation 3>, if we 
add and subtract the counterfactual term E[Y0i | Di = 1] (results that would have happened 
to participants if they have not participated in the program), it does not affect the equation 
but allows us to differentiate the treatment effect from the selection bias as shown in 
<Equation 4>: 
<Equation 4> E[Y1i|Di = 1] - E[Y0i|Di = 0] 
= E[Y1i|Di = 1] - E[Y0i|Di = 1] + E[Y0i|Di = 1] - E[Y0i|Di = 0] 
= E[Y1i - Y0i|Di = 1] + E[Y0i|Di = 1] - E[Y0i|Di = 0] 
= Average treatment effect + Selection bias
E[Y1i|Di = 1] - E[Y0i|Di = 1] shows the actual treatment effect which is the difference 
between the outcomes for the treatment group when they received the treatment and the 
outcomes for the counterfactual. In reality, we cannot observe the outcome for the 
counterfactual (E[Y0i|Di = 1]) but only the outcome for the control group E[Y0i|Di = 0], 
and the difference between these two terms (E[Y0i|Di = 1] - E[Y0i|Di = 0]) is called the 
selection bias. For this reason, if we calculate the difference in average values for the 
treatment and control groups, we will be calculating the average treatment effect together 
with the selection bias as shown in <Equation 4>. 
Most empirical studies aim to disentangle the causal effect from the selection bias, and 
it is important to minimize the selection bias. The potential outcome model shows that an 
RCT can perfectly eliminate the selection bias. By randomly creating two groups from a 
large enough sample, there will be no difference in characteristics between the two groups. 
If we provide treatment to one of the two randomly assigned groups, all characteristics 
apart from the treatment status will be the same between the two groups and we will be 
able to observe a counterfactual group. Since there is no correlation between the treatment 
status (Di) and the outcome variable, Y0i and  Y1i are orthogonal to Di.  In this case, 
E[Y0i|Di = 0], the second term of <Equation 3>, can be replaced with E[Y0i|Di = 1], and 
we can come up with <Equation 5> in which the average treatment effect can be 
separated from the selection bias.
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<Equation 5> E[Y1i|Di = 1] - E[Y0i|Di = 0] 
= E[Y1i|Di = 1] - E[Y0i|Di = 1] 
= E[Y1i - Y0i|Di = 1] 
= E[Y1i – Y0i] = Average treatment effect
As shown in <Equation 5>, researches based on RCTs are able to overcome the 
selection bias, which is one of the major barriers for causal inference.  In an RCT-setting, 
the project impact can be evaluated by comparing the average difference between the 
treatment and control groups.9) 
Baseline, Mid-line, and Endline Survey
In order to evaluate the impact of the Myanmar rural community development project, 
we conducted three rounds of survey including baseline, midline, and endline surveys. 
When KOICA signed a contract with the Korea Rural Community Corporation, the 
implementing agency for the rural development project in Myanmar, a total of four surveys 
of 100 villages were reflected in the budget. As described in Chapter 2, in order to 
conduct a rigorous impact evaluation of the Myanmar rural community development 
project, KOICA signed an MOU with the KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
and shared the evaluation budget to conduct three rounds of survey for 100 SMU villages 
and 50 control villages. 
In December 2015, after conducting a household census for 100 project villages, 5,500 
households (about 30% of the total 18,456 households) were randomly selected and a 
baseline survey was conducted in February 2016. The reason for conducting a household 
census prior to the baseline survey was to confirm that the sample of the baseline survey 
was representative of the population. As shown in Table 1, there is no statistical difference 
between the population (n = 18,456) and the sample (n = 5,515) in terms of household 
characteristics, occupation, land ownership, and asset ownership. This shows that the 
sample accurately reflects the characteristics of the population. However, the baseline 
survey for 100 projects villages was conducted after the first year of the implementation, 
which is a limitation of the research design.10) 
9) For an ideal RCT setting, the following problems should not be faced: 1) non-random assignment of treatment; arbitrary 
changes in treatment status 2) refusal of receiving treatment status by treatment group 3) different attrition pattern 
between treatment and control groups 4) Hawthorne effect which causes changes in behavior due to the project
10) If there were positive effects right after the start of the first-year implementation, these effects should be neglected 
since we are examining the changes between the baseline and midline or endline. For this reason, the effect that 
happened between the beginning of the implementation (July 2015) and the baseline data collection (February 2016) are 
not reflected in the impact evaluation analysis and thus our results can be an underestimation or overestimation of the 
18
Table 1: Assessment of sample representativeness













POPULATION (N = 18,456 households)    
Mean 4.01 2.07 0.04 0.50 2.90 12.78 0.19 0.01 0.002
(SD) (1.67) (1.12) (0.20) (0.50) (5.85) (107.56) (0.55) (0.14) (0.05)
SAMPLE (n = 5,515 households)    
Mean 3.98 2.06 0.04 0.49 2.94 12.49 0.19 0.01 0.002
(SD) (1.67) (1.12) (0.20) (0.50) (5.85) (107.56) (0.55) (0.14) (0.04)
T -1.40 -0.90 -0.75 -0.93 0.41 -0.20 0.54 0.42 -0.53
(p-value) (0.16) (0.37) (0.45) (0.35) (0.68) (0.84) (0.59) (0.67) (0.60)
Source: 2016 Census and Baseline Data from KOICA Saemaul Undong (SMU) Project in Myanmar
Notes: Standard deviations and p-values are reported in parentheses. 
While preparing for the baseline survey of 100 villages, the research team discussed 
the selection of control villages with the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Agriculture 
of Myanmar. In the Nay Pyi Taw region, which has a total of 40 project villages, a total 
of 16 control villages were selected from 3 townships. From Bago, Mon, Tanintharyi, and 
Yangon regions, each of which has 6 project villages, 3 control villages were selected 
from each region. 
In Ayeyarwaddy, Mandalay, Sagaing, and Shan regions, there were 10 project villages 
in each region. 6 control villages were selected from Ayeyarwaddy and Shan regions, and 
5 villages were selected from Mandalay and Sagaing regions. In December 2016, baseline 
survey was conducted for 3,000 households (60 households from each village).
If the project villages and control villages were randomly selected before the project 
started, the main characteristics between the two groups would have been similar on 
average. However, 100 project villages were selected prior to the selection of the control 
villages, and the difference in characteristics between the treatment and the control villages 
is inevitable. Table 2 shows the difference in means  in terms of demographic and 
socio-economic status of households, and community characteristics between treatment and 
control villages.
No statistically significant difference was found between the two groups in terms of 
demographic characteristics, including female household head, household head's age, and 
true effect.  
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marital status. However, the socio-economic status including household head’s education 
level, employment status, land ownership status, household assets, electricity use, water pipe 
use, etc. was statistically significantly better in the treatment villages compared the control 
villages. Also, treatment villages were more likely to have a primary school and health 
facilities within the village compared to control villages. The fact that the project villages 
have a better environment in many ways than the control villages can create an 
overestimation bias in evaluating the effectiveness of the rural community development 
project. Considering the possibility of this overestimation, the characteristics of each village 
were controlled for in all regression analyses, and time-invariant village characteristics were 
controlled for by using the difference-in-difference method. 
Table 2: Balance between Treatment and Comparison Villages
 (1) (2) `(3)
Comparison Treatment T-test
Variable Mean/SE Mean/SE P-value
Female household head 0.190 0.204 -0.014
[0.007] [0.005]
Household head's age 50.394 50.691 -0.297
[0.266] [0.202]
Marital Status 0.758 0.772 -0.014
[0.008] [0.006]
Household head completed high school 0.023 0.033 -0.010***
[0.003] [0.002]
Household head employed 0.726 0.786 -0.060***
[0.008] [0.006]
Own land 0.411 0.449 -0.038***
[0.009] [0.007]
Asset index -0.073 0.040 -0.112***
[0.028] [0.022]
Access to electricity 0.564 0.593 -0.029***
[0.009] [0.007]
Have pipe water 0.120 0.338 -0.218***
[0.006] [0.006]
Have primary school 0.804 0.860 -0.056***
[0.007] [0.005]
Have hospital 0.224 0.309 -0.085***
 [0.008] [0.006]  
Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are the differences in the means across the groups. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent significant level.
After completing the baseline survey, a midline survey was conducted in February 
2018 for a total of 8,500 households in 100 project villages and 50 control villages. 
During the midline survey, most of the information collected during the baseline survey 
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was repeatedly asked, and a module on women's leadership and behavioral experiments 
were conducted to measure social capital. 
In order to analyze the impact of differential incentive system based on inter-village 
competition, one of the key mechanisms of the Myanmar rural community development 
project, on social capital, a public goods game which involves inter-village competition was 
introduced. Lastly, after the third year of project implementation, we conducted the endline 
survey in May 2019. During the endline survey, we collected the same information 
collected during the previous rounds of surveys, and  also conducted another behavioral 
experiment to measure if inter-village competition improves joint investment with 
uncertainty. 
In summary, the Myanmar rural community development project is the first among 
KOICA projects to systematically conduct a large-scale impact evaluation which involves 
three rounds of data collection. The first evaluation plan which was to conduct a 
before-and-after analysis without selecting control villages developed into a more rigorous 
difference-in-difference method by selecting control villages ex-post. Also, we were able to 
carry out an RCT-based impact evaluation by conducting two behavioral experiments 
during the midline and endline data collection. 
WB Measuring Social Capital
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the rural community development project in 
Myanmar, we aimed to analyze the increase of social capital in the villages as a 
short-term outcome and the increase of household income as a mid- to long-term outcome. 
We used the survey questionnaire from “Measuring Social Capital” developed by the 
World Bank (Grootaert et al. 2002; Grootaert et al. 2004) to measure social capital. In 
particular, we asked questions related to  1) Groups and Networks, 2) Trust and Solidarity, 
3) Collective Action and Cooperation, 4) Information and Communication, and 5) Social 
Cohesion and Inclusion.
Difference-in-Differences
The impact evaluation study of the Myanmar rural community development project 
applies the difference-in-differences method to identify the program’s causal impact. 11)  
Difference-in-difference is a methodology widely used in social science in order to 
11) For more information on difference-in-difference strategy, refer to Gertler et al. (2016). 
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rigorously identify the causal relationship. For the difference-in-difference method, we first 
need to identify the control and treatment groups and compare the before-and-after changes 
of key outcome variables (including level of social capital and household income) between 
the treatment and control groups. The first difference is comparing the before and after, 
and the second difference is comparing the treatment and control groups. 
The key assumption of difference-in-difference strategy is that the treatment group 
follows a similar trajectory compared to the control group prior to the intervention, even if 
the baseline characteristics of the treatment and control groups are different. By satisfying 
this assumption, we can control for time-varying trends that are commonly applied to the 
treatment group and the control group as well as time-invariant differences between the 
treatment group and the control group. Thus, the causal effect of the policy or program 
can be identified. 
The regression equation for the difference-in-difference method is as follows.  is the 
outcome variable for individual i, in village j, at time period t,  is a dummy variable that 
equals to 1 if individual i lives in a treatment village.  is a dummy variable that equals to 
0 for baseline value and 1 for post-intervention value.  is a control vector that includes 
the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respondent. 
Coefficient  shows the difference between treatment and control groups, and coefficient  
shows the difference between before and after the intervention. We are primarily interested 
in the value for , the coefficient for the interaction term between  and . If the Myanmar 
rural community development project had a positive impact on social capital and income, 
the coefficient  will be statistically significant.
Since we conducted three rounds of survey for the Myanmar rural community 
development project, we include midline and endline dummies instead of a post dummy, 
and each of these dummies are interacted with the treatment dummy. In sum, we examine 
the short-term impact of the project by looking at  - the interaction term between 
treatment and midline dummies, and the long-term impact by looking at  – the interaction 
term between treatment and endline dummies.  
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Lab-in-the-Field Experiments
The impact evaluation of the Myanmar rural community development project includes 
the difference-in-difference approach that compares the average change over time in the 
treatment and control groups, as well as an randomized control experiment (RCT) 
component by conducting behavioral experiments to measure the impact of the inter-village 
competition.  Two types of behavioral experiments were conducted – (i) public goods 
experiment during the midline survey; and (ii) joint investment experiment during the 
endline survey.
When measuring trust and collective action, the core concept of social capital, with 
self-reported questionnaires, a social desirability bias may occur in a socially desirable 
direction. In order to more closely measure social capital, which is a key outcome variable 
of this project, a behavioral experiment was introduced to measure trust and collective 
action through individual’s action instead of self-reported answers. The public goods game 
measures how much individuals donate for public goods of their community in the 
presence of free riding incentives. The joint investment experiment measures whether an 
individual will invest in a joint investment project when the success probability of the 
project depends on the number of participants. 
The public goods game is described in detail in Appendix 1. During the midline 
survey, 5,000 kyat was distributed to survey participants and they were asked to make a 
donation out of the 5,000 kyat for their village. We handed out two envelopes - one 
envelope with a “you” sign with 5,000 kyat, and another with a “village” sign which was 
empty. After making the donation to the village envelope, we asked the survey participants 
to hand in the village envelope to the enumerators. In case survey participants did not 
donate any amount, they were allowed to hand in an empty envelope to the enumerators. 
Since respondents could face social pressure if they make decisions in front of the 
enumerators, we asked the respondents to make the decision in a separate room. We 
randomly selected half of the survey participants, and conducted inter-village public goods 
game. Similar to the evaluation method of the Myanmar rural community development 
project, based on the amount of average donation 100,000 kyat was provided to the top 50 
villages, and 50,000 kyat was provided to the next 50 villages. We analyzed whether 
inter-village competition affects decisions to donate for public goods.
For the joint investment experiment, we created groups of 14 participants in each 
village and asked if they would like to invest in the joint investment project. Participants 
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receive 2,000 kyat, and if they decide not to participate in the joint investment project, 
they can keep the endowment for themselves. If the participant decides to participate in 
the joint investment project, they will have a chance to receive 4,000 kyat depending on 
the success probability. If the project fails, they lose the initial endowment of 2,000 kyat. 
As shown in Figure 3, the success probability of the joint investment project depends on 
the number of participants in their group that decide to invest in the project. If no one 
decides to participate in the project, the success probability is zero over 25 (or 0%), If all 
14 participants decide to invest, the success probability is 14 over 25 (which equals to 
56%). If all participants decide to invest under an uncertain circumstance, the expected 
return from investing in the joint investment project (2,240 kyat) exceeds the return from 
not investing (2,000 kyat). 
Figure 3. Success Probability of Joint Investment Project
When individuals with credit constraints are unable to start new businesses, joint 
investments based on mutual trust and cooperation can help overcome the existing 
constraints and promote new businesses to increase income. Joint investment is one of the 
key mechanisms for income generation in rural communities. Since individuals face 
uncertainties when investing in a joint project, trust and collective action among members 
are important and the joint investment experiment is designed to measure this social 
capital.
Similar to the public goods experiment, the top 50 villages with the highest number of 
investors in the joint investment experiment receive 100,000 kyat as incentives, and the 
next 50 villages receive 50,000 kyat which can be used for village development. We 
examine the impact of inter-village competition on the likelihood to invest in a joint 
investment project with uncertainty. 
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Results
Importance of Initial Conditions
Before examining the impact of the Myanmar rural community development project, 
this report examines the correlation between the initial conditions of 100 treatment villages 
prior to the intervention and the success implementation of the project. Based on the social 
capital information of each village collected during the baseline survey, we created three 
social capital indices including (i) aggregate level of trust; (ii) level of collective action; 
and (iii) level of social cohesion. Table 5.1.1 shows the impact of these initial conditions 
on project success. 
We find that one standard deviation increase in trust level increases the probability of 
being selected as A-ranked villages (top 30 villages) by 22.5 percentage point and decreases 
the probability of being selected as C-ranked villages (bottom 30 villages) by 18/2 
percentage point. We find similar results for collective action as well as social cohesion. 
Table 5.1.1: Impact of Social Capital on CDD Performance
　 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: A-Ranked Village C-Ranked Village
Panel A:











Basic Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Socio-economic Status No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Panel B: 　 　 　 　 　 　














Basic Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Socio-economic Status No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Panel C:











Basic Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Socio-economic Status No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: Basic controls include (i) number of households in village; (ii) village population size; (iii) percentage of 
household’s part of major ethnic group; (iv) percentage of female-headed households; (v) percentage of 
married household head; (vi) percentage of Buddhist household head; and (vii) length of residency. 
Socio-economic status includes (i) percentage of household head with at least high school education; (ii) 
percentage of household head employed; (iii) percentage of household head working as farmer; (iv) 
percentage of household owning land; (v) monthly income. 
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Similarly, villages with higher level of social capital are more likely to receive “A” 
for two consecutive years, while those villages with lower social capital are more likely to 
receive “C” for two consecutive years. One standard deviation increase in trust level is 
associated with 15.8 percentage point increase in the probability of being selected as 
A-ranked villages for two consecutive years, and a 10.7 percentage point decrease in the 
probability of being selected as C-ranked villages for two consecutive years. We find 
stronger impact for collective action. One standard deviation increase in collective action 
level is associated with 23.4 percentage point increase in the probability of being selected 
as A-ranked villages for two consecutive years and 34.6 percentage point decrease in the 
probability of being selected as C-ranked villages for two consecutive years.  Since 
A-ranked villages in the first year are also likely to receive A-ranking in the second year, 
we see similar results for Table 5.1.1 and Table 5.1.2. 
Table 5.1.2: Social Capital on Performance of AA/CC Villages
　 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
　 AA Villages CC Villages
Panel A:
Aggregate index of trust 0.126* 0.140* 0.158* -0.122*** -0.111* -0.107*
(0.0691) (0.0755) (0.0803) (0.0429) (0.0562) (0.0631)
Basic controls o o o o
Socio-economic status o o
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Panel B:
Aggregate index of collective action 0.201** 0.223** 0.244** -0.313*** -0.318*** -0.283**
(0.0930) (0.0998) (0.103) (0.109) (0.111) (0.116)
Basic controls o o o o
Socio-economic status o o
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Panel C:
Aggregate index of social cohesion 0.212** 0.236** 0.234** -0.278* -0.296** -0.346***
(0.0883) (0.100) (0.111) (0.141) (0.137) (0.126)
Basic controls o o o o
Socio-economic status o o
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: Basic controls include (i) number of households in village; (ii) village population size; (iii) percentage of 
household’s part of major ethnic group; (iv) percentage of female-headed households; (v) percentage of 
married household head; (vi) percentage of Buddhist household head; and (vii) length of residency. 
Socio-economic status includes (i) percentage of household head with at least high school education; (ii) 
percentage of household head employed; (iii) percentage of household head working as farmer; (iv) 
percentage of household owning land; (v) monthly income.
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However, as shown in Table 5.1.3 self-reported level of social capital is not correlated 
with villages that received C in the first year but improved to B or A in the second year 
or villages that received A in the first year but downgraded to B or C in the second year. 
This finding suggests that while initial conditions are important for project success, other 
factors such as leadership, teamwork, and governance can help overcome the unfavorable 
initial conditions.
Table 5.1.3: Social Capital on Improvement or Downgrading of Village Performance
　 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
　 Improving Villages(C to B or A) Downgraded Villages(A to B or C)
Panel A:
Aggregate index of trust -0.0206 -0.0172 -0.0518 0.0476 0.0294 0.0492
(0.0477) (0.0571) (0.0658) (0.0464) (0.0460) (0.0467)
Basic controls o o o o
Socio-economic status o o
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Panel B:
Aggregate index of collective 
action -0.00366 0.0164 -0.0265 0.107* 0.0607 0.0437
(0.0752) (0.0799) (0.0867) (0.0567) (0.0573) (0.0611)
Basic controls o o o o
Socio-economic status o o
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Panel C:
Aggregate index of social 
cohesion 0.0134 0.0169 0.0353 -0.0459 -0.0352 -0.00540
(0.0524) (0.0666) (0.0684) (0.118) (0.103) (0.0972)
Basic controls o o o o
Socio-economic status o o
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: Basic controls include (i) number of households in village; (ii) village population size; (iii) percentage of 
household’s part of major ethnic group; (iv) percentage of female-headed households; (v) percentage of 
married household head; (vi) percentage of Buddhist household head; and (vii) length of residency. 
Socio-economic status includes (i) percentage of household head with at least high school education; (ii) 
percentage of household head employed; (iii) percentage of household head working as farmer; (iv) 
percentage of household owning land; (v) monthly income. 
DD Estimation Results
By analyzing the three waves of data using the difference-in-difference strategy, we 
examine the impact of the Myanmar rural community development project on social capital 
and income generation. In order to examine the impact of the project on the level of trust, 
we used 5-likert scale variables including (i) most people who live in this village can be 
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trusted; (ii) in this village, it is unlikely someone will take advantage of you; (iii) trust in 
strangers; (iv) trust in local government officials; (v) trust in central  government officials; 
and (vi) level of trust in this village improved. The interaction term between the midline 
dummy and treatment dummy shows the impact at the midline, and the interaction term 
between the endline dummy and treatment dummy shows the impact at the endline.
According to Table 5.2.1, while there are no changes in level of trust among village 
members (column 1-3), there is an increase in trust level of local and central government 
officers (column 4-5). This finding suggests the need for having a close relationship with 
local and central officers (including MOALI) for successful implementation of the project. 
The average trust level within the village (column) has increased by 0.199 standard 
deviation at midline compared to the baseline, and by 0.139 standard deviation at endline 
compared to the baseline. This shows that there has been an increase in trust level 
throughout the project implementation. 
Table 5.2.1: Trust in Different People
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Most people 




















Level of trust 
in this village 
improved.
Midline * SMU -0.008 0.014 0.017 0.068*** 0.091*** 0.199***
(0.012) (0.021) (0.011) (0.020) (0.017) (0.032)
Endline * SMU -0.026* 0.000 0.006 0.059*** 0.106*** 0.139***
(0.014) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.037)
SMU 0.030** 0.015 -0.018 -0.057*** -0.102*** 0.001
(0.012) (0.014) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.028)
Midline 0.045*** -0.017 0.038*** 0.020 0.020 -0.100***
(0.012) (0.020) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.027)
Endline 0.071*** -0.078*** 0.130*** 0.030* 0.027* 0.014
(0.012) (0.020) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.031)
Basic Controls O O O O O O
Region Fixed Effect O O O O O O
Constant 0.881*** 0.772*** 0.116*** 0.863*** 0.878*** 0.478***
(0.017) (0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.037)
Observations 25,361 25,361 25,361 25,361 25,361 25,361
R-squared 0.021 0.016 0.028 0.028 0.036 0.047
Notes: For column (1) – (5), 5-Likert scale variables are converted into dummy variables. Control variables include 
female-headed household, marital status of household head, household head’s religion, education level of household 
head, land ownership, and residency length. Region fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at 
village-level.
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In Table 5.2.2, we examine the impact of the Myanmar rural community development 
project on collective action. In order to measure the level of collective action, we ask 
respondents the following questions - (i) in the past 12 months, if they have worked with 
others in your village/neighborhood to do something for the benefit of the community; (ii) 
if more than half of people in this village/neighborhood contribute time or money toward 
common development; and (iii) if there was a water supply problem in this community, 
how likely it is that people will cooperate to try to solve the problem. While we do not 
find any statistically significant impact on collective action, we find that village members 
living in treatment villages are more likely to contribute their time and money for their 
village development by 0.085 standard deviation compared to those living in control 
villages. However, this impact disappears in the endline. 
Table 5.2.2: Collective Action
 (1) (2) (3)
In the past 12 months, have 
you worked with others in 
your village/neighborhood to 
do something for the benefit 
of the community?
More than half of people in 
this village/neighborhood 
contribute time or money 
toward common development
If there was a water supply 
problem in this community, 
how likely is it that people 
will cooperate to try to solve 
the problem?
 
Midline * SMU 0.013 0.085*** 0.004
(0.013) (0.021) (0.010)
Endline * SMU 0.008 0.022 -0.004
(0.013) (0.024) (0.012)
SMU 0.009 0.037** 0.024***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.007)
Midline 0.009 -0.097*** 0.002
(0.014) (0.021) (0.011)
Endline -0.008 -0.055*** 0.001
(0.013) (0.020) (0.013)
Basic Controls O O O
Region FE O O O
Constant 0.902*** 0.789*** 0.911***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.015)
Observations 24,522 25,361 25,361
R-squared 0.027 0.031 0.011
Notes: For column (3), 5-Likert scale variable is converted into a dummy variable. Control variables include female-headed 
household, marital status of household head, household head’s religion, education level of household head, land 
ownership, and residency length. Region fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at village-level.
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In Table 5.2.3, we look at the impact of the project on social cohesion. Specifically, 
we investigate its impact on (i) how strong the feeling of togetherness or closeness in 
their village/neighborhood is; (ii) if any differences cause problems; and (iii) if there are 
any community activities in which they are not allowed to participate. We find that the 
project did not have any impact on social cohesion. 
Table 5.2.3: Social Cohesion
 (1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
How strong is the feeling of 
togetherness or closeness in 
your village/neighborhood?
Do any differences 
cause problems?
Are there any community 
activities in which you are 
not allowed to participate?
    
Midline * SMU -0.003 -0.013 0.003
(0.006) (0.024) (0.003)
Endline * SMU -0.009 0.004 0.007
(0.008) (0.018) (0.004)
SMU 0.016*** -0.020* -0.003**
(0.005) (0.011) (0.001)
Midline 0.025*** 0.114*** -0.013***
(0.007) (0.022) (0.003)
Endline 0.016* 0.047*** -0.020***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.005)
Constant 0.933*** 0.058*** 0.992***
(0.012) (0.022) (0.004)
Basic Controls O O O
Region FE O O O
Observations 25,361 25,361 25,361
R-squared 0.005 0.037 0.006
Notes: For column (1), 5-Likert scale variable is converted into a dummy variable. Control variables include female-headed 
household, marital status of household head, household head’s religion, education level of household head, land 
ownership, and residency length. Region fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at village-level.
In Table 5.2.4, we examine if the project improves the availability of public goods in 
the village. We examined the availability of (i) garbage collection service; (ii) public 
sewage system; (iii) public standpipe; and (iv) public transport system. Since garbage 
collection and public sewage systems were part of the improving environment projects, we 
see a large impact on the availability of these two services as expected. The availability of 
garbage collection service increased by 0.263 standard deviation at the midline, and by 
0.299 standard deviation at the endline. The availability of public sewage system increased 
by 0.33 standard deviation at the midline, and by 0.22 standard deviation at the endline. 
Many villages also reported to have installed public water tanks but we do not see a 
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statistically significant impact. Finally, public transport system was not part of the rural 
community development project and thus we see statistically insignificant impact with 
coefficient close to 0. 
Table 5.2.4: Provision of Public Goods







     
Midline * SMU 0.263*** 0.330*** 0.049 -0.000
(0.043) (0.041) (0.048) (0.075)
Endline * SMU 0.299*** 0.220*** -0.037 -0.009
(0.076) (0.058) (0.049) (0.111)
SMU 0.026 0.003 0.122*** 0.163**
(0.017) (0.007) (0.030) (0.072)
Midline 0.022 0.052** 0.058* -0.049
(0.016) (0.021) (0.033) (0.059)
Endline 0.170*** 0.279*** -0.001 0.061
(0.054) (0.048) (0.032) (0.091)
Constant -0.108 -0.068 -0.068* 0.163
(0.077) (0.067) (0.038) (0.130)
Basic Controls O O O O
Region FE O O O O
Observations 25,361 25,361 25,361 25,361
R-squared 0.250 0.247 0.089 0.081
Notes: The dependent variables in column (1) – (3) ask the fraction of community served by the service and the variables 
are converted into dummy variables so that 1 equals to most of the community being served by the service. Control 
variables include female-headed household, marital status of household head, household head’s religion, education 
level of household head, land ownership, and residency length. Region fixed effects are included and standard errors 
are clustered at village-level.
Similarly, the project did not aim to increase the availability of schools or hospitals, 
and thus as shown in Table 5.2.5, we do not see any impact on availability of schools or 
hospitals.
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Table 5.2.5: Availability of Community Infrastructure
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary School Middle School High School Hospital
     
Midline * SMU -0.066 -0.070 -0.037 -0.028
(0.042) (0.067) (0.029) (0.068)
Endline * SMU -0.042 0.013 0.033 -0.019
(0.093) (0.096) (0.061) (0.111)
SMU 0.054 0.029 -0.032 0.075
(0.062) (0.075) (0.044) (0.075)
Midline 0.193*** 0.087 0.069** 0.213***
(0.050) (0.059) (0.032) (0.056)
Endline 0.090 -0.029 0.001 0.185**
(0.089) (0.083) (0.054) (0.092)
Constant 0.795*** 0.046 -0.031 0.509***
(0.073) (0.084) (0.051) (0.116)
Basic Controls O O O O
Region FE O O O O
Observations 25,361 25,361 25,361 25,361
R-squared 0.042 0.062 0.060 0.056
Notes: The dependent variables in all columns are dummy variables asking if their community has the specified facility 
available within their community. Control variables include female-headed household, marital status of household 
head, household head’s religion, education level of household head, land ownership, and residency length. Region 
fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered at village-level.
In Table 5.2.6, we examine how the project affected the environment of the villages. 
There was an increase in availability of employment by 31 percentage point at midline, 
and by 20.4 percentage point at endline (Column 1). There was an improvement in 
condition of roads by 20.2 percentage point at midline and there was no statistically 
significant change at endline (Column 2). Most villages focused on improving road 
conditions during the first two years of project implementation, and allocated more budget 
for income generation activities during the second and third year of project implementation. 
This implementation pattern is shown in our data – we see clear impact on condition of 
roads at the midline, and large improvement in housing conditions at the endline. The 
quality of housing improved by 48 percentage point at midline, and by 35.8 percentage 
point at endline. Lastly, the percentage of respondents answering that their overall quality 
of life improved increased by 47.5 percentage point at midline and by 33.8 percentage 
point at endline. These findings confirm the effectiveness of the living environment 
improvement interventions as part of the Myanmar rural community development project. 
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Table 5.2.6: Impact on Community Characteristics







Overall quality of 
life
     
Midline * SMU 0.310*** 0.202** 0.480*** 0.475***
(0.070) (0.095) (0.056) (0.062)
Endline * SMU 0.204** 0.093 0.358*** 0.338***
(0.090) (0.103) (0.073) (0.070)
SMU 0.191*** 0.121 -0.064 0.023
(0.059) (0.084) (0.052) (0.049)
Midline 0.256*** 0.641*** 0.197*** 0.108*
(0.063) (0.080) (0.060) (0.056)
Endline 0.367*** 0.785*** 0.467*** 0.347***
(0.090) (0.091) (0.075) (0.067)
Constant 3.168*** 3.592*** 3.581*** 3.530***
(0.091) (0.098) (0.084) (0.070)
Basic Controls O O O O
Region FE O O O O
Observations 25,361 25,361 25,361 25,361
R-squared 0.099 0.182 0.165 0.122
Notes: The dependent variables of columns (1) – (4) are 5-Likert scale variables and are converted into dummy variables. 
Each dummy variable equals to 1 when the respondents answerd ‘improved’ or ‘strongly improved’. Control variables 
include female-headed household, marital status of household head, household head’s religion, education level of 
household head, land ownership, and residency length. Region fixed effects are included and standard errors are 
clustered at village-level.
The main outcome variable for the Myanmar rural community development project is 
income generation. The major activity for income generation was microfinance.  Village 
members of treatment villages started different income generation activities by borrowing 
micro-loans. Table 5.2.7 shows that at midline access to microfinance increased by 48.5 
percentage point and by 35.2 percentage point at endline. While there was no significant 
impact on employment, household income increased by 22.3 percentage point at midline 
and by 23.9 percentage point at endline.  These results show that the income generation 
project had an impact of greatly improving household income, and the results are 
significant throughout the midline as well as endline.  
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Table 5.2.7: Impact on Income Generation
(1) (2) (3)
Access to microfinance Employed Log of income
    
Midline * SMU 0.485*** -0.029 0.223***
(0.051) (0.029) (0.052)
Endline * SMU 0.352*** -0.049 0.239**
(0.046) (0.031) (0.095)
SMU -0.266*** 0.075*** -0.030
(0.041) (0.013) (0.059)
Midline -0.270*** -0.396*** 0.174***
(0.049) (0.029) (0.055)
Endline 0.030 -0.349*** 0.116
(0.047) (0.0271) (0.085)
Constant 0.648*** 0.683*** 6.935***
(0.050) (0.035) (0.088)
Basic Controls O O O
Region FE O O O
Observations 25,361 25,361 21,139
R-squared 0.143 0.133 0.090
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is whether the household had access to microfinance, village credit union or 
financial cooperative such as ROSCA (Rotating Saving and Credit Association) in their village or in the neighboring 
villages in the past 12 months. The dependent variable in column (2) is whether the household head is currently 
employed. The dependent variable in column (3) is the log of total income of the household including regular and 
seasonal income. 
In summary, the rural community development project in Myanmar had an impact of 
increasing level of social capital, and the availability of public goods including garbage 
collection services and public sewage systems.  The overall quality of life also greatly 
improved and household income also increased. This result shows that the project was 
successful in meeting the initial project objectives. Due to the limitation of the research 
design, it is impossible to show perfect causation of the project. At the same time, we 
control for time-invariant variables in our analysis, and thus the results can be considered 
as robust impact evaluation findings.
Lab-in-the-Field Results
For the analysis of the behavioral experiments results, we will be following the 
pre-analysis plan and analyze the Myanmar results together with the Cambodia results. In 
this report, we will be looking at the results of the public goods game conducted during 
the midline survey. 
The overall impact evaluation of the Myanmar rural community development project 
was conducted with a difference-in-difference analysis comparing the treatment villages and 
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the control village. Considering the limitations of the research design, we also introduced 
an RCT-based behavioral experiments to analyze the impact of the differential incentive 
system on social capital. We randomly assigned the households in both the treatment and 
control villages into two groups – (i) competition group where we introduce inter-village 
competition component during the behavioral experiments; and (ii) non-competition group.
The first step in analyzing an RCT-based study is to determine whether the mean 
characteristics of the treatment and control groups are balanced. Table 5.3.1 shows that the 
treatment and comparison groups of the public goods game have similar characteristics on 
average. Column 3 shows that the treatment and control groups are balanced in terms of 
(i) female-headed households; (ii) marital status; (iii) education level of household head; 
(iv) ethnicity; (v) religion; (vi) land ownership; (vii) length of residency; (viii) employment 
status of household head; (ix) household head as farmer; and (x) asset index. The 
percentage of household head with at least primary school education is slightly higher in 
the treatment group (31.3%) compared to the (29.4%). Similarly, Table 5.3.2 shows that 
the treatment and comparison groups of the joint investment game have similar 
characteristics on average.
Table 5.3.1: Randomization Balance: Public Goods Experiment
　 (1) (2) (3)
Non-Competition Competition T-Test
Variable Mean/SE Mean/SE Coefficient/SE
Female-Headed Household 0.531 0.534 0.00238
[0.013] [0.013] (0.0108)
Married Household Head 0.763 0.776 0.0121
[0.008] [0.008] (0.00913)
Household Head with at least primary school 
education 0.294 0.313 0.0189*
[0.015] [0.014] (0.00997)
Household Head as Major Ethnicity 0.866 0.864 -0.00247
[0.026] [0.026] (0.00740)
Buddhist Household Head 0.971 0.973 0.00219
[0.009] [0.008] (0.00357)
Household owning land 0.463 0.473 0.0101
[0.018] [0.018] (0.0108)
Length of residency over 45 years 0.436 0.431 -0.00511
[0.012] [0.012] (0.0107)
Household Head Employed 0.581 0.587 0.00671
[0.016] [0.016] (0.0107)
Household Head as Farmer 0.301 0.310 0.00908
[0.015] [0.016] (0.00998)
Asset Index -0.010 0.010 0.0200
　 [0.072] [0.070] (0.0353)
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Table 5.3.2: Randomization Balance: Joint Investment Experiment
　 (1) (2) (3)
Control Competition T-Test
































Table 5.3.3 shows that the impact of inter-village competition is limited. The 
coefficient for the competition dummy is 0.00483 (column 2) which is close to 0 and 
insignificant. While the percentage of donation for the non-competition group in comparison 
villages is 65.5 percent, the percentage of donation is higher in the SMU villages by 14.6 
percentage point (22.3%). This implies that the level of social capital in the SMU villages 
is higher than that in the comparison villages which is an indirect evidence of the impact 
of the Myanmar rural community development project on social capital. 
Similarly, the inter-village competition does not have any significant impact on 
investment decision during the joint investment game (Column 4). At the same time, 
households in the SMU villages are 1.96 percentage point more likely to invest in the 
joint investment game compared to households in the comparison villages. In case of the 
joint investment experiment, most of the survey participants (93.3%) decided to invest 
during the experiment and there is limited room for the inter-village competition. 
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Table 5.3.3: Impacts of Inter-village Competition on Public Goods and Joint Investment
　 (1) (2) (3) (4)
　 Village Donation (%) Decided to Invest
Competition 0.00402 0.00483 0.0141** -0.000658
(0.00550) (0.0101) (0.00565) (0.0128)
SMU 0.146*** 0.0194**
(0.0227) (0.00906)
Competition * SMU -0.00123 0.0223
(0.0121) (0.0141)
Observations 8,515 8,515 8,371 8,371
R-squared 0.080 0.127 0.010 0.013
Mean of dependent variable 0.755 0.655 0.945 0.933
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Control variables include (i) ethnicity of a household head; (ii) 
female-headed household; (iii) married household head; (iv) Buddhist household head; (v) length of residency 
over 45 years; (vi) household head with at least high school education; (vii) household head employed; (viii) 
household head working as a farmer; (ix) household owning land; (x) asset index; (xi) community has access to 
market; (xii) community has public transport system; (xiii) community has primary school; and (xiv) community 
has hospital. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To summarize the results of the behavioral experiment, the inter-village competition 
does not significantly affect the donation made during the public goods experiment and the 
investment decision during joint investment experiment. Due to the high giving culture of 
Myanmar, it is important to consider that there is limited room for the impact of 
competition on the percentage of donation or decision to invest. 
In case of SMU villages, the percentage of donation to the village joint fund and the 
percentage investing in joint investment project under uncertainty was statistically 
significantly higher than that of the control village. It can be interpreted as evidence that 
the level of social capital is higher in SMU villages than control villages. Lastly, the 
behavioral experiments for designed for two countries including Myanmar and Cambodia. 
In the Pre-Analysis Plan, the research team planned to analyze both Cambodia and 
Myanmar. While the lack of impact of the inter-village competition in Myanmar may have 
resulted from the high level of social capital in the country (the ceiling effect), we may 
expect positive impact of inter-village competition in Cambodia due to the low level of 
social capital in the country.  While we have not included the results for Cambodia in this 
report, there is a positive impact of inter-village competition on the percentage of donation 
and decision to invest. The impact of inter-village competition was especially shown among 
SMU villages possibly since households in the SMU villages have experienced differential 
incentive system based on inter-village competition.  
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Discussion
The Myanmar rural community development project is the largest impact evaluation 
study implemented by KOICA. At the same time, the impact evaluation design suffers 
from some limitations, and this section provides suggestions for future impact evaluation 
studies. 
Random selection of project villages
When discussing the master plan with the recipient country regarding the 
implementation of a development project, different decisions need to be made including the 
selection of project villages. Ideally, selection of recipient households should be based on 
humanitarian perspective. However, political, economic, cultural and social factors are 
considered when deciding the project villages. For this reason, it is difficult to argue for 
random selection of project villages for a rigorous impact evaluation. At the same time, 
many recipient countries are interested in a rigorous evaluation of a project in order to 
expand and continue development projects. 
When discussing the master plan for development projects with recipient countries, we 
can consider two types of impact evaluation based on randomized controlled trial. First, 
after considering different aspects, we can reduce the candidate for project villages to 
twice, and randomly select half of the candidate villages. As an alternative way, we can 
select project villages and randomly select half of the villages to receive the intervention 
and implement the intervention in the remaining villages after the end of the impact 
evaluation study.  In this case, the project will be implemented in all of the recipient 
villages at a different timeline.  One important point is that we should discuss with the 
recipient countries that we can implement a rigorous impact evaluation design without 
changing the master plan. 
The Millennium Villages Project is a large-scale rural community development project 
implemented from 2005 to 2015 benefiting 500,000 people in 10 African countries with a 
budget over 200 billion won. The project aimed to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals  related to agriculture, education, health, hygiene, environment, and capacity building, 
and reached great progress in eradicating poverty and achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (Sachs, 2018; Mitchell et al. 2018). When selecting the project villages 
in the beginning, the project failed to select control villages which was regarded as a 
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limitation in scientifically evaluating the project (Clemens and Demombynes, 2011). If the 
Millennium Village Project could have been scientifically tested based on a strict impact 
evaluation design, the project would have spread to other African and developing countries 
after the end of the project.  
In case of the KOICA Myanmar rural community development project, we conducted a 
difference-in-difference method as we were not able to randomly select the control villages. 
Although it can be evaluated as an improvement of the Millennium Villages Project, it is 
still difficult to conduct a rigorous evaluation as the baseline characteristics between the 
treatment and control villages are not balanced.  KOICA and the Myanmar government 
decided to implement the second five-year Rural Community Development Project from 
2022. If we randomly select the project villages as well as the beneficiaries prior to the 
implementation of the project, we expect to have an advanced impact evaluation design 
compared to the first five-year project evaluation. 
Implementation of Impact Evaluation
There was no discussion on the impact evaluation of the Myanmar rural community 
development project until 2015, and the rural community development project was 
spontaneously added. For this reason, the implementation of the baseline survey was 
postponed and there was a gap of 10-months between the baseline data collection of 
project villages and that of control villages.  Apart from these research-related limitations, 
there were other difficult situations while implementing the impact evaluation. In this 
section, we critically evaluate the implementation of the impact evaluation, and provide 
recommendations for future impact evaluation projects.  
For the Myanmar rural community development project, Korea Rural Community 
Corporation served as the implementing agency in the field (PC), and Korea Institute for 
Development Strategy managed the project (PM). The Korea Institute for Development 
Strategy covered personnel expenses and travel expenses related to the impact evaluation 
and helped the research team carry out the project. At the same time, data collection 
expenses were covered by the Korea Rural Community Corporation. As described above, 
the survey budget, which was reflected in the budget of the Korea Rural Community 
Corporation, only considered the survey cost for 100 project villages. The cost for the 
remaining 50 villages was supported by the KDI School of Public Policy and Management. 
At that time, the KOICA managed the impact evaluation work for the Myanmar rural 
community development project by the Rural Development Team. As the Rural 
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Development Team disappeared after the restructuring of KOICA, the impact evaluation 
work was transferred to the newly established Department of Economic and Social 
Development. Subsequently, the impact evaluation work was finally transferred to Southeast 
Asia Team. The impact evaluation work was coordinated by the department in charge of 
the project, not the evaluation team of KOICA, and the KOICA office in Myanmar 
actively supported the Korea Rural Community Corporation, implementing agency in the 
field, and the impact evaluation field work. In other words, the implementing system of 
the impact evaluation research has been fragmented, and had to rely on the goodwill of 
PC, PM, KOICA headquarters, and KOICA local offices. 
The impact evaluation research design is closely connected to the implementation 
method, and thus it is effective for the implementing agency (PC) to take charge of the 
impact evaluation project. At the same time, the independence of the impact evaluation 
study may be questioned when the implementing agency conducts the evaluation. Therefore, 
under the assumption that the PM is empowered to have a practical influence on the PC, 
it is advisable for the PM to manage the impact evaluation work. Similarly, in the case of 
the representative flagship project impact assessment promoted by KOICA, it is necessary 
to consider the impact assessment work in the KOICA evaluation office rather than the 
impact assessment work conducted by the department responsible for the actual business 
within KOICA. Similarly, in case of an impact evaluation of the flagship project by 
KOICA, it is recommended for the KOICA evaluation office, instead of the implementing 
office, to conduct the impact evaluation work. It is not necessary to conduct impact 
evaluation study for all of the projects by KOICA. Most of the projects can be evaluated 
using the process evaluation method or PDM. 
In summary, for KOICA projects undergoing rigorous impact evaluation, the PM (not 
the implementing agency) should independently conduct the impact evaluation project. Also, 
the project should be managed by the evaluation office of the KOICA, while other 
KOICA offices and field offices support the project.
Feedback Method of Impact Evaluation
The feedback process, which enhances the efficient implementation of impact evaluation 
findings into policies, is the fundamental reason for conducting impact evaluation. 
(Sanderson, 2002; Parsons, 2002). However, one of the important issues to consider when 
establishing evidence-based policies is how to balance the rigor of impact evaluation and 
the timeliness of the feedback. The more rigorous impact evaluation results are pursued, 
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the longer it takes for the evaluation results to be derived. In particular, understanding the 
long-term effect of a specific project or program literally takes a long time. From the 
standpoint of enforcing programs and policies, policymakers are likely to prefer a real-time 
feedback. 
In the case of the Myanmar rural community development project, the baseline survey 
was conducted in 2016 and the endline survey was completed in 2019. It took about 4 
years to complete the baseline survey, midline survey, and endline survey, and in the 
process, a feedback process was not established to reflect the results of the impact 
evaluation. Due to the nature of the impact evaluation, the impact evaluation results can 
only be found after the completion of the endline survey. At the same time, we regret that 
we were not able to regularly share the summary statistics or pre-post analysis of the 
project with the implementing agencies. 
In the future, when conducting a large-scale impact evaluation research on the KOICA 
flagship development project, it is necessary to approach the evaluation results in a 
systematic manner. It is also necessary to institutionalize from the beginning of the project 
how to provide timely feedbacks on the impact evaluation, which is conducted over a long 
period of time, while analyzing rigorous causal evidence through a randomized controlled 
trial method. Considering that the impact evaluation results can be derived after the end of 
the project, we can consider sharing the summary statistics, before and after analysis, and 
correlation analysis immediately after the baseline survey through meetings and seminars. 
At the same time, it will be desirable for the KOICA evaluation office to institutionalize 
the feedback process.
Conclusion
This impact evaluation report evaluates the Myanmar rural community development 
project implemented jointly by the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and 
the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Irrigation (MOALI) over the past five years 
(2014-2019). The effectiveness of the project is analyzed by combining an experimental 
and quasi-experimental evaluation method. During the beginning of the project, it was not 
possible to set up a control group and perform a rigorous randomized controlled trial. As 
we set up the control villages ex-post to perform a strict impact evaluation, we conducted 
a difference-in-difference, which is a quasi-experimental evaluation method. Also, we 
randomly assigned sampled households into two groups in order to understand the effect of 
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differential incentive payment through inter-village competition, which is a key mechanism 
of the Korean rural community development project.
The results of the impact evaluation are as follows. First, we empirically tested if 
villages with higher social capital are likely to perform better in implementing the 
community-driven development project than other villages. We found that villages with 
higher level of social capital are more likely to be selected as A-ranked villages for the 
first two years, while villages with low level of trust are more likely to be selected as 
C-ranked villages for the first two years. However, this level of existing social capital 
cannot explain the pattern for the villages where performances were improved or 
downgraded. This finding implies that other factors such as the role played by local 
leaders, village development project governance, or implementation process of the project 
may be more important in explaining the changes in implementation success of village 
development projects.
In order to examine the impact of the Myanmar rural community development project, 
we also conducted a difference-in-difference analysis using the baseline, midline and 
endline surveys conducted in both the treatment and control villages. The project increased 
the level of social capital by 0.2 standard deviation and improved the level of trust 
towards local and central government officials as well as collective action among village 
members. There were also improvements in road and housing conditions as well as the 
availability of public goods including garbage collection services and public sewage 
systems.  Regarding the income generation projects, there was a great increase in access to 
microfinance, and household income increased by 22-24%. In summary, the 
difference-in-difference approach shows that the project increased the level of social capital, 
living environment and household income. 
Lastly, the behavioral experiment results show that inter-village competition, which is 
the key mechanism for the Korean rural community development project, does not have a 
statistically significant impact. Myanmar has consistently ranked at the top of the World 
Giving Index, which shows the strong giving culture in Myanmar. The initially high level 
of social capital in Myanmar suggests that there is limited room for impact of CDD 
projects on building social capital in the country. For this reason, we are planning to 
analyze the behavioral experiment results jointly for Myanmar and Cambodia as written in 
the Pre-Analysis Plan.
The Myanmar Rural Community Development Project has great significance in that it 
is the first large-scale impact evaluation research conducted by KOICA. A number of 
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problems were identified in the process of planning the impact evaluation, but together 
with KOICA, KOICA Myanmar Office, Korea Rural Community Corporation, Korea 
Development Strategy Institute, and KDI School of Public Policy and Management, we 
were able to successfully complete the five-year impact evaluation study. In the future, 
when conducting such a large-scale impact evaluation study, it is needed to improve the 
following points – (i) randomly selecting treatment and control villages prior to the start 
of the project; (ii) the governance system to efficiently conduct the impact evaluation 
study, and (iii) the feedback process that meets balance between rigorousness and 
timeliness. If we improve the afore-mentioned points, we expect that KOICA will play a 
leading role in aid effectiveness and evidence-based policy making among international 
donor agencies. 
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Appendix 1
Public Goods Experiment Instruction
We invite you to one brief exercise before the survey starts. This exercise 
involves real money reward. 
We will give you two envelopes. One envelope printed with “YOU” contains 
5000 Myanmar Kyat (25 bills of 200 Kyat), and the other one printed with 
“VILLAGE” is empty. You will be asked to make a donation out of the 5000 Kyat 
to your village. Your donation to the village will be used for your community - for 
example improving the road, public schools, or public hospitals. Note that your 
decision will be kept strictly private and confidential. 
  ● “YOU” envelope   ● “VILLAGE” envelope
  ● Initially with 5000 Kyat  ● Initially empty
  ● This is for yourself    ● This is for donation
Once you decide on the amount of money to donate to your village, please go to 
an isolated area and reallocate the amount from the “YOU” envelope to the 
“VILLAGE” envelope. Please remember that you can choose not to donate any 
amount to the village. The remaining amount in the “YOU” envelope becomes your 
money reward. After you keep the “YOU” envelope in a safe place, please bring 
back the “VILLAGE” envelope to the enumerator and enter the “amount of your 
donation” in the tablet. Please make sure the amount in the “VILLAGE” envelope 
matches the amount entered in the tablet. 
The other survey participants of your village will make similar decisions. At the 
end of the survey, we will calculate the total amount of donation made by the 
VILLAGEYOU
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participants of your village. 
In addition to the total amount of donation, your village will have an opportunity 
of earning extra money. 150 villages in Myanmar including your village will join a 
competition through the amount of donation. We will rank 150 villages in terms of 
the average amount of donation made by participants. If your village belongs to the 
group of the top 50 villages (ranked between 1st and 50th), your village will earn 
100,000 Myanmar Kyat. If your village belongs to the group of the next 50 villages 
(ranked between 51st and 100th), your village will earn 50,000 Myanmar Kyat. If 
your village belongs to the group of the bottom 50 villages (ranked between 101st 
and 150th), your village will receive no extra bonus. If your village and other villages 
made same average amount of donation, we will randomly decide the ranking of your 
village and other villages. These extra money rewards will be added to the total 
village donation.
Two months after completing the survey, the village assembly meeting will be 
organized. At that time we will revisit your village and deliver your village chief the 
total amount of donation made by the participants of your village plus any extra 
money your village earns. Again, no one in your village will know how much you 
keep for yourself or donate for the village
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Appendix 2
Instruction for Joint Investment Experiment
Thank you very much for your time to participate in this survey. As a token of 
appreciation, you are given 2,000 Kyat. Please, check whether you have 2,000 Kyat. 
This is your money and you can use it for your personal use. Please, put this 
envelope in your personal closet in your room and come back here to participate in 
the survey. 
We invite you to one brief task before the survey starts. Each task involves real 
money reward. 
In this task you will be given 2,000 Myanmar Kyat. You will be asked to decide 
how to use this money between two options. You can either keep this money for 
your personal use or invest this money to a joint project in which the other 
participants of your village can join. The total number of participants who make this 
decision in your group is 14. 
If you decide to keep this money for your personal use, your earnings in this task 
is simply 2,000 Kyat. 
If you decide to invest this money to a joint project, your earnings in this task 
will depend on whether a joint project succeeds or fails. If the project succeeds, you 
will earn two times of 2,000 Kyat (that is, 4,000 Kyat). If it fails, you will earn 
nothing (that is, 2,000 Kyat that you invested will be lost). 
The chance of the project succeeding will depend on how many participants out 
of 14 participants invest their money to the project. Specifically, the chance of the 
project succeeding will be equal to the ratio of the number of investors to 25:
 [Explanation of Probability Concept with Beans]
Please prepare 14 white beans, 25 black beans, and a plastic bag. Please explain first 
that the participant can think of the white beans as “participants in his/her village that 
invest their money,” and the total number of beans should equal to 25 in any case.  If 
higher number of participants invest their money, winning probability increases. If there are 
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higher number of white beans in the bag, the probability of picking a white bean 
increases.
  1. Put one white bean and 24 black beans in the bag (this case means that you are 
the only investor in your group and all of the others do not invest). Then, shuffle the 
beans without looking inside the bag. Ask a survey participant how likely it is to 






   Answer should be (1) Very unlikely or (2) Unlikely
  2. Put 5 white beans and 20 black beans in the bag (This case means that five 
participants including you in your group invest and nine other participants do not 
invest). Then, shuffle the beans without looking inside the bag. Ask the following 
question to the survey participant: “Compared to the previous case where we only 
have one white bean in the bag, do you think the probability of picking a white bean 
increased or decreased?”
(1) Increased
(2) Stay the same
(3) Decreased
   Answer should be (1) Increased
  3. Put 10 white beans and 15 black beans in the bag (This case means that ten 
participants including you in your group invest and four other participants do not 
invest). Then, shuffle the beans without looking inside the bag. Ask the following 
question to the survey participant: “Compared to the previous case where we have 
five white beans, do you think the probability of picking a white bean increased or 
decreased?”
(1) Increased
(2) Stay the same
(3) Decreased
   Answer should be (1) Increased
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  4. Put 7 white beans and 18 black beans in the bag (This case means that seven 
participants including you in your group invest and seven other participants do not 
invest). Then, shuffle the beans without looking inside the bag. Ask the following 
question to the survey participant: “Compared to the previous case where we have 10 
white beans, do you think the probability of picking a white bean increased or 
decreased?”
(1) Increased
(2) Stay the same
(3) Decreased
   Answer should be (3) Decreased
  5. Put 14 white beans and 11 black beans in the bag (This case means that all 
participants including you in your group invest). Then, shuffle the beans without 
looking inside the bag. Ask the following question to the survey participant: 
“Compared to the previous case where we have 7 white beans, do you think the 
probability of picking a white bean increased or decreased?”
(1) Increased
(2) Stay the same
(3) Decreased
  Answer should be (1) Increased
  If the participant incorrectly answered more than 3 out of 5 questions, please repeat 
1-5 above. Please ask if the participant understands the probability concept. If yes, 
please explain the following point and practice with the respondent:
 If more participants decide to invest during the joint investment game, this case 
is similar to increasing the number of white beans in the bag. 
 The respondent should randomly select a bean from a non-transparent plastic 
bag with one white bean and 24 black beans five times with replacement (This 
case means that you are the only investor in your group and all of the others 
do not invest. Also, your leader donates none). After the five-time practice, tell 
the participant that it is very unlikely to succeed the joint investment project in 
this case. 
 The respondent should randomly select a bean from a non-transparent plastic 
bag with 14 white bean and 11 black beans five times with replacement (This 
case means that all participants including you in your group invest). After the 
five-time practice, tell the participant that it is still possible that you lose your 
investment even if all 14 participants decide to invest.
In addition to your earnings, your village will have an opportunity of earning money. 
150 villages in Myanmar including your village will join a competition through the amount 
of joint investment. We will rank 150 villages in terms of the total amount of joint 
investment made by 14 participants in each of the 150 villages. If your village belongs to 
the group of the top 50 villages (ranked between 1st and 50th), your village will earn 
100,000 Myanmar Kyat. If your village belongs to the group of the next 50 villages 
(ranked between 51st and 100th), your village will earn 50,000 Myanmar Kyat. If your 
village belongs to the group of the bottom 50 villages (ranked between 101st and 150th), 
your village will receive no money. If your village and other villages made same average 
amount of joint investment, we will randomly decide the ranking of your village and other 
villages. 
Therefore, before making your decision, you may need to think about how many 
participants would invest their money to a joint project. Note that your decision will be 
kept strictly private and confidential.
The other survey participants in your group will make the same kind of decisions. If 
the decisions of all participants are made, we will calculate the chance of the project 
succeeding. In case you invested, your earnings will be determined according to this 
chance. 
Once you complete the survey, you are going to receive 1,000 Kyat as a token of 
appreciation. At the end of the survey in your village, we will revisit your house and 
deliver this amount of 1,000 Kyat and the amount of money you earned in case you 
invested and the project succeeded. Again, no one in your village will know about your 
decision.
Two months after completing the entire survey in 150 villages, we will revisit your 
village and deliver your SMU Chairman (in the treatment villages) or the village chief (in 
the control villages) the total amount of bonus money in case your village earned.
